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Near Earth Objects (NEOs) present one of the greatest threats to Earth, but 
currently there is no U.S. or international response and mitigation strategy in place for a 
NEO impact. This thesis examines case studies from two other high impact low 
probability (HILP) events—earthquakes and volcanoes—with the intent of applying 
lessons learned to the formulation of a NEO mitigation strategy. The case studies include 
domestic and international examples, offering insights into the critical areas of education 
and training, infrastructure, and communications. Considering the destructiveness of the 
threat, it would be in the best interests of global leaders to develop a NEO strategy that 
uses best response practices from these other events. This thesis recommends the use of 
an early warning system, greater involvement of leadership, and crowdsourcing ideas 
beyond the public sector. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
There was a time when people believed that all swans were white, and the mythic 
black swan was the stuff of fairytales. Then came the discovery of Australia, and the 
black swans that are native to that continent. In 2001, Nassim Nicholas Taleb advanced 
the three principles of his “black swan theory”: 1) the event is a rarity, 2) the impact is 
extreme, and 3) the event can be explained in retrospect.1 To Taleb, the black swan 
symbolizes that there is “a severe limitation to our learning from observations or 
experience” and a “fragility of our knowledge.”2  
A Near Earth Object (NEO) impact falls into the category of a black swan or high 
impact low probability (HILP) event as it meets each of the three aforementioned criteria. 
NASA defines NEOs as “comets and asteroids that have been nudged by the gravitational 
attraction of nearby planets into orbits that allow them to enter the Earth’s 
neighborhood.”3 To date, 14,166 NEOs have been discovered, of which 879 are asteroids 
that measure 1 km or greater in diameter.4 In addition, 1,689 NEOs are considered 
Potentially Hazardous Asteroids (PHAs).5 While the topic of NEOs is not necessarily 
new—and even though NEOs present a grave existential threat to the United States and 
the international community—because impact is seen as a very low probability event, 
relatively little research has been done to examine possible mitigation strategies. It is only 
within the last two decades that any concerted national or international actions have been 
taken to examine potential responses to this threat. This thesis will examine if lessons 
from other HILP events could be applied to the NEO issue and possibly help form a more 
cohesive response strategy for the United States and other nations.  
                                                 
1 Nassim Nicholas Taleb, “The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable,” The New York 
Times, April 22, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/22/books/chapters/0422-1st-tale.html?_r=1. 
2 Ibid. 
3 “Near Earth Object Program: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ),” National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), accessed September 4, 2016, http://neo.jpl.nasa.gov/faq/. 
4 Ibid.  
5 Ibid. 
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B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The topic of NEOs is particularly significant for a number of reasons, ranging 
from the catastrophic effects an impact would have on the United States and the world to 
the fact that Congress has tasked NASA to categorize 90 percent of all NEOs that are 
140 meters or greater in diameter by 2020.6 The latter is a task that requires technological 
resources and cooperation from the international community.  
In addition, some of the existing mitigation scenarios promote the use of nuclear 
weapons for a deflection campaign in space. The use of nuclear weapons in space is 
expressly forbidden, and such an action would violate the terms of the 1967 Treaty on 
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, also known as the Outer Space Treaty. 
The Outer Space treaty explicitly states that, “States shall not place nuclear weapons or 
other weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies or station them in outer 
space in any other manner.”7 It would also violate the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, 
which “prohibits nuclear weapons tests ‘or any other nuclear explosion’ in the 
atmosphere” and “in outer space.”8  
Lastly, despite the potential catastrophic consequences of a NEO impact on Earth, 
there are no established disaster management protocols for U.S. emergency personnel to 
follow in the event of impact. Steps need to be taken to ensure that the threat of a NEO 
can be addressed in a manner that will minimize the fallout.  
                                                 
6 Russell Schweickart et al., “Asteroid Threats: A Call for Global Response,” Association of Space 
Explorers, September 25, 2008, 12, http://www.space-explorers.org/ATACGR.pdf. 
7 “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,” United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, accessed 
April 4, 2016, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introouterspacetreaty.html. 
8 “Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water,” 
United States Department of State, accessed May 11, 2016, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4797.htm. 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Researchers claim that an asteroid impacted Earth over 65 million years ago, 
causing the death of more than 70 percent of life on the planet.9 This theory is known as 
the Alvarez hypothesis and has been largely validated by the scientific community.10 The 
asteroid that caused the extinction of so many species is known as K-T and is estimated 
to have been 10 km in diameter. The Earth has not since experienced another natural 
event this catastrophic, but researchers are now looking closely at the threat of NEOs. As 
tracking and detection capabilities improve, even more potentially dangerous NEOs will 
likely be discovered.11  
The issue of NEOs is complex for a number of reasons, ranging from the arduous 
task of cataloging them to the development of national and global protocols for dealing 
with them. According to Chapman and Morrison, the cataloging “degree of completeness 
for 1 km objects is less than 5 percent.”12 This fact is jarring, considering that NEOs in 
the range of 0.5 km can upset the ecosystem enough to impact crop production and “kill 
unprecedented numbers of people.”13 Although an impact may be geographically 
localized, the interconnectedness of today’s world means that the after-effects could be 
far-reaching. The situation is aptly described by researchers Lee, Preston, and Green, who 
state, “The impact of future crises are unlikely to remain local—regardless of their 
origins—and will likely affect more than one country or region. The vulnerabilities of 
globalized supply chains and particularly the just in time business model are likely to be 
exposed by any disruption lasting more than a few days.”14 
                                                 
9 “Dinosaurs – Why Did They Go Extinct?” Smithsonian National Museum of Natural History,” 
accessed April 4, 2016, http://paleobiology.si.edu/dinosaurs/info/everything/why_7.html. 
10 Clark R. Chapman and David Morrison, “Impacts on the Earth by Asteroids and Comets: Assessing 
the Hazard,” Nature 367 (January 1994): 33, doi: 10.1038/367033a0. 
11 “Recommendations of the Action Team on Near-Earth Objects for an International Response to the 
Near-Earth Object Impact Threat,” United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, 6, accessed April 4, 
2016, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/oosadoc/data/documents/2013/aac.105c.1l/aac.105c.1l.329_0.html. 
12 Chapman and Morrison, “Impacts on the Earth by Asteroids and Comets,” 34. 
13 Ibid., 33. 
14 Bernice Lee, Felix Preston, and Gemma Green, Preparing for High-Impact, Low-Probability 
Events: Lessons from Eyjafjallajokull (London, United Kingdom: Chatham House, 2012), viii, accessed 
April 5, 2016, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/181179. 
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The existing literature on NEOs focuses mainly on the importance of cataloging 
and characterizing NEOs, promoting international coordination and cooperation for NEO 
surveillance and deflection strategies, and theorizing mitigation strategies. Limited 
funding has created an obstacle to the comprehensive monitoring of NEOs. In addition, 
researchers largely cite international cooperation as necessary when addressing the NEO 
issue, but the question of who should participate, and to what degree, is more difficult to 
address. Lastly, as mentioned previously, the most popular proposed mitigation scenarios 
involve measures that could violate international treaties. Consequently, this literature 
review will discuss the current status of the NEO issue with the intent of identifying gaps 
in mitigation strategies, particularly those related to U.S. homeland security.  
1. Catalog and Characterize NEOs 
In 2001, the United Nations assembled an action team on NEOs with the purpose 
of coming up with recommendations for an international response to a NEO impact 
threat. The team proposed that the first step would be to identify the objects and assess 
the risk of impact to Earth.15 In addition, NASA is also working to meet U.S. 
congressional demands that call for the discovery and tracking of NEOs larger than 
140 meters, which need to be at 90 percent completion by 2020.16 Funding is one of the 
major obstacles to meeting this goal.17 The International Asteroid Warning Network 
(IAWN) serves as the main hub for the institutions that monitor NEOs and acts as an 
“internationally recognized clearinghouse for the receipt, acknowledgment, and 
processing of all NEO observations.”18 IAWN has little online presence and few updates 
reflective of its small budget. This lack of resources would likely inhibit IAWN’s ability 
to coordinate with participating nations. A network would be better equipped to track and 
                                                 
15 “Recommendations of the Action Team on Near-Earth Objects,” United Nations Office for Outer 
Space Affairs, 1. 
16 Russell L. Schweickart, “Decision Program on Asteroid Threat Mitigation,” Acta Astronautica 65, 
no. 9 (2009): 1403, doi: 10.1016/j.actaastro.2009.03.069. 
17 Casey Johnston, “NASA Asteroid-tracking Program Stalled Due to Lack of Funds,” Ars Technica, 
August 13, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/science/2009/08/nasa-asteroid-tracking-program-stalled-due-to-
lack-of-funds/. 
18 “Recommendations of the Action Team on Near-Earth Objects,” United Nations Office for Outer 
Space Affairs, 2–3. 
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characterize NEOs more effectively than this single institution. Furthermore, the lack of 
investment signals a weakness for meeting the NEO tracking goal mandated by Congress. 
2. International Cooperation and Coordination 
Researchers agree that international coordination and cooperation is integral when 
dealing with the NEO issue, but the scope of these efforts is in question. In 2008, the 
Association of Space Explorers (ASE) set forth a report to the United Nations that called 
for the development of a global response protocol for planetary defense against a NEO 
impact.19 Despite this effort, the issue of international cooperation is multi-faceted and 
raises a number of questions. For example, the United States has taken the lead in NEO 
research, but a NEO could impact any part of the globe, which would necessitate 
participation from other nations. Former Apollo astronaut Russell Schweickart notes, 
“The need for international coordination in making such a decision is determined by the 
natural uncertainty regarding which specific populations are at risk in predicting an 
impact and the inherent shifting of risk in the process of deflection.”20 A. C. Charania 
proposes that nations would likely have to pool technological resources for deflection 
missions in the event of a NEO impact,21 which would be difficult to execute due to 
limited manpower and funding.22 Additionally, there exists the problem of ascertaining 
whether only states with space capabilities and developed programs can participate in 
deflection mission planning. One proposed solution is to have space-faring states lead 
response efforts for “planetary defense.”23 Unifying international allies in NEO research 
could increase monitoring capabilities, funding, and technology.  
In addition, some proposed mitigation scenarios could lead to geopolitical issues 
for the United States. Researchers note that a deflection scenario that involves changing a 
                                                 
19 A. C. Charania and Agnieszka Lukaszczyk, “Assessment of Recent NEO Response Strategies for 
the United Nations,” AIP Conference Proceedings 1103, no. 393 (February 2009): 2, accessed April 5, 
2016, http://swfound.org/media/10045/neoresponse-al-iac-2009.pdf. 
20 Schweickart, “Decision Program on Asteroid Threat Mitigation,” 1403. 
21 Charania and Lukaszczyk, “Assessment of Recent NEO Response Strategies,” 3. 
22 Ibid., 4. 
23 Ibid. 
 6
NEO impact site could compromise other areas if the process were “terminated or only 
partially completed.”24 This scenario of a failed deflection attempt that would place the 
impact at another point along the “risk corridor” presents a major problem both for the 
inhabitants of the impact area and for the United States in terms of disrupting 
international relations, particularly with allies.25 Schweickart argues that “a collaborative, 
global response is required…and it is highly desirable that a decision process, with 
agreed criteria, policies, and procedures be established prior to the development of a 
specific threat in order to assure that minimization of risk to life and property prevail over 
competing national self-interests.”26 Due to uncertainty regarding impact point 
calculations, it can be difficult to know what states are at risk, thereby making the 
argument that a more comprehensive international participant buy-in is necessary.27 
3. Mitigation Strategies 
A NEO impact would qualify as a natural disaster although an impact actually 
could be prevented, unlike other cases such as tsunamis and volcanoes for which no 
deflection scenario is feasible.28 The U.N. Action Team on NEOs argues that this unique 
aspect “obligates the international community to establish a coordinated response to the 
NEO threat.”29 Spacefaring states could have an opportunity to respond to a NEO event 
due to the potential for predictability and intervention. These mitigation strategies fall 
into the categories of space-based and Earth-based responses.  
Space-based deflection responses are the most prominent category of mitigation 
models. According to Nicolas Peter, these responses range from: a) kinetic deflection 
where “a large spacecraft is sent to impact and deflect the NEO using only kinetic 
energy”; b) nuclear deflection where “nuclear explosions are triggered at a distance, on 
                                                 
24 Schweickart, “Decision Program on Asteroid Threat Mitigation,” 1406. 
25 D. K. Yeomans et al., “Deflecting a Hazardous Near-Earth Object” (paper presented at the 1st IAA 
Planetary Defense Conference - Protecting Earth from Asteroids, Granada, Spain, April 27–30, 2009).  
26 Schweickart, “Decision Program on Asteroid Threat Mitigation,” 1403. 
27 Ibid. 
28 “Recommendations of the Action Team on Near-Earth Objects,” United Nations Office for Outer 
Space Affairs, 5. 
29 Ibid. 
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the surface or after penetration, provoking the ejection of rocks from the NEO, which in 
turn reacts by a small deflection”; c) nuclear destruction or “pulverization”; d) or a 
“billiards shot” where a small asteroid is purposely directed for collision with the 
threatening NEO.”30 The 4th IAA Planetary Defense Conference held in April 2015 
produced a paper stating that given the advanced lead time of a PHA, “impactors are the 
preferred deflection option for the more common, smaller asteroids.”31 Conversely, for 
asteroids that are larger and could result in “catastrophic” impact, or those that offer less 
response time, deflection via nuclear explosives may be the best option.32 In 2008, a 
Natural Impact Event Interagency Planning Exercise, involving subject matter experts 
from U.S. government entities, ran an exercise to simulate how the U.S. government 
might respond to a NEO impact. The exercise involved two scenarios: the first focused 
on a response to an impact predicted within 72 hours, and the second focused on 
deflection plans if the impact time was approximately seven years away. One of the 
major findings of this exercise was that the “NEO impact scenario is not captured in 
existing plans.”33 In addition, conflicting views exist on which organization would take 
the lead in a deflection effort.34 
Moreover, space-based mitigation responses can be problematic due to legal and 
communications issues. The nuclear mitigation option would require revision of existing 
international laws and treaties.35 Specifically, as noted earlier, placing nuclear weapons 
in space violates the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and the Test Ban Treaty of 1963.  
                                                 
30 Nicolas Peter et al., “Charting Response Options for Threatening Near-Earth Objects,” Acta 
Astronautica 55 (August 2004): 328, doi: 10.1016/j.actaastro.2004.05.031. 
31 David S. P. Dearborn and Jim M. Ferguson, “When an Impactor Is Not Enough: The Realistic 
Nuclear Option for Standoff Deflection” (paper presented at the 4th IAA Planetary Defense Conference - 
PDC 2015, Rome, Italy, April 13–17, 2015) 1.  
32 Dearborn and Ferguson, “When an Impactor is Not Enough, 1.”  
33 Directorate of Strategic Planning, United States Air Force, AF/A8XC Natural Impact Hazard 
(Asteroid Strike) Interagency Deliberate Planning Exercise After Action Report (Washington, DC: United 
States Air Force Headquarters, December 2008), 
http://neo.jpl.nasa.gov/neo/Natural_Impact_After_Action_Report.pdf. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Peter et al., “Charting Response Options,” 329. 
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Considering the potential for lengthy debate on new legal precedents, it is not surprising 
that little work has been done to date. 
Earth-based mitigation responses are limited to relocation and sheltering of those 
in the path of a NEO. The existing literature has made little mention of Earth-based 
scenarios, other than that the involvement of disaster management responders would be 
necessary if a NEO impact is not deflected. According to researchers Peter, Barton, 
Robinson, and Salotti, current communications among “relevant agencies” regarding 
strategies for NEO response missions are disorganized and badly executed.36 This is 
alarming considering that experts estimate that due to the large number of uncategorized 
NEOs, a sudden unpredicted impact is more probable than a scenario in which a 
threatening NEO is discovered in time for mitigation strategies to be deployed.37 This 
assertion is even more worrisome when coupled with the estimate by experts that Earth 
has a 1/3000 chance of being struck by a NEO measuring 1 km within the next century.38  
This review suggests that protocols for a NEO response need to be created, as do 
practices among emergency personnel. The existing body of literature on NEOs makes 
some mention of lessons from other HILP events, and how they could be useful in 
forming an effective mitigation and communications strategy. However, no in-depth 
study relating the two has been developed.  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Although the United States may be the leading nation in NEO research, it is still 
ill prepared to deal with the consequences of a NEO impact.39 Avoiding and mitigating a 
NEO impact can only come to pass if there is, as Schweickart argues, a “capable early 
warning system, a deflection capability, and an institutional process capable of making 
timely decisions.”40 Currently, none of the aforementioned tools are fully functioning. 
                                                 
36 Peter et al., “Charting Response Options,” 326. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Chapman and Morrison, “Impacts on the Earth by Asteroids and Comets,” 39. 
39 Nicholas J. Bailey et al., “Global Vulnerability to Near-Earth Object Impact,” Risk Management 12, 
no. 1 (2010): 49, doi:10.1057/rm.2009.16. 
40 Schweickart, “Decision Program on Asteroid Threat Mitigation,” 1405. 
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Research has found that the mitigation process for NEOs is not broken, but rather that it 
is virtually non-existent and that “the management and design of NEO response missions 
and communication between the relevant agencies are poorly addressed.”41 As discussed 
in the literature review, some of the major obstacles are related to funding issues, poor 
communications, and technological boundaries.  
This thesis will focus on the hypothesis that other HILP event response strategies 
could be applied to a NEO impact. Specifically, strategies that could be most applicable 
for a NEO response relate to: 1) education and training, 2) infrastructure development, 
and 3) communications strategy. Initial research for this thesis suggests that the United 
States could take active steps to inform disaster management organizations on the NEO 
threat. While an event such as K-T impact may pose insurmountable problems for an 
Earth-based disaster response because of its implications, a smaller NEO impact might be 
addressed by a coordinated national and international strategy.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis will employ a case study approach to assess how the domestic and 
international communities prepare and response to HILPs. These cases of other HILP will 
be analyzed in regard to their potential application to NEO impact mitigation strategies. 
Specifically, this thesis aims to draw parallels between such HILP events as volcano 
eruptions and tsunamis and to examine whether lessons learned from those events could 








                                                 
41 Peter et al., “Charting Response Options,” 326. 
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II. BACKGROUND ON NEO EVENTS 
To date, there have been three noteworthy NEO Earth impact events. The first 
occurred over 65 million year ago in the Gulf of Mexico, while the second impacted rural 
Russian territory known as Tunguska in 1908. The third, most recent impact happened in 
Chelyabinsk, Russia, in 2013. Despite the large threat posed by a NEO impact, no formal 
mitigation strategy exists. This chapter will present background information on past NEO 
events and outline the current state of NEO responses.  
A. K/T IMPACT 
A mass extinction event, known as K-T or Cretaceous-Tertiary, occurred 65 
million years ago and according to researchers, wiped out approximately 70 percent of 
Earth’s species including most of the dinosaurs.42 For decades, researchers were unable 
to find the root problem that caused the extinction until 1980 when physicist Luis Alvarez 
and his son, a geologist, found a large amount of iridium in the sedimentary layers from 
the Cretaceous period.43 For reference, iridium is often found in asteroids but is a rarity to 
Earth. The Alvarez Theory hypothesizes that a 6-mile wide meteor, composed mostly of 
iridium, struck the Earth. The size of the meteor would account for the global layer of 
iridium in the sediment.44 Moreover, the meteor impact would have caused incredibly 
high temperatures that led to massive fires, which is supported by the presence of soot 
found in the sediment layer near the iridium.45 This hypothesis has become the leading 
theory for the mass extinction event and is largely validated by the scientific community. 
The Chicxulub crater, located in the Yucatan, corroborates the events outlined by the 
Alvarez theory as it is 112 miles in diameter and is estimated to be 65 million years old.46 
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A number of other natural disasters—ranging from tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, 
and earthquakes, to massive fires—resulted from the impact that created the Chicxulub 
crater.47 The K-T event was equivalent to the detonation of 100,000 billion tons of TNT, 
causing “an earthquake one thousand times greater than the largest ever recorded.”48 K-T 
shot a substantial quantity of debris into and above the atmosphere, which led to long-
lasting and destructive after-effects. Large fragments re-entered the atmosphere at 
velocities high enough to cause global forest fires on impact. The remaining fine dust 
particles settled in the atmosphere, effectively blocking sunlight and causing 
temperatures to drop, resulting in a phenomenon called “impact winter.”49  
B. THE TUNGUSKA IMPACT 
Although not nearly as devastating as K-T, the Tunguska, Russia, impact in 1908 
became the first large-scale asteroid event in modern history.50 The impact caused the 
destruction of 2,000 square miles of surrounding forest, or approximately 80 million 
trees.51 Residents living as far as 40 miles away felt the heat from the impact.52 In 
addition, the meteor caused an earthquake that allowed seismic shockwaves to travel as 
far as England.53 Asia reported lighter night skies, a result of light reflecting off of dense 
clouds and a chemical reaction.54 Wildlife in the area was decimated, but as the region 
was sparsely populated, there were no human casualties.55  
Interestingly, despite the rural environment, the Tunguska event offered 
researchers the first eyewitness accounts of a NEO event. One such witness recounted 
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that “the sky was split in two, and high above the forest the whole northern part of the 
sky appeared covered with fire…At that moment there was a bang in the sky and a 
mighty crash…The crash was followed by a noise like stones falling from the sky, or of 
guns firing.”56 The firsthand accounts offer valuable insight into both a NEO impact and 
the aftereffects.  
The impact at Tunguska was the equivalent of 185 Hiroshima atomic bombs, or 
10–15 megatons of TNT.57 Despite the sizable force and impact, no formal study was 
conducted until 1927 when Leonid Kulk and a Russian team ventured to the area.58 The 
area exhibited a butterfly shape with the head portion as the “epicenter of the explosion” 
or “the point where the shock wave first” hit.59 The team found no impact crater, which 
Kulk explained was likely due to the soggy terrain and the buried meteor material. Kulk 
hypothesized that a dig would produce evidence of the meteor at depths of approximately 
25 meters. In 2013, Kulk’s hypothesis was confirmed by researchers who analyzed rock 
samples and found the “rocks had meteoric origin.”60 To add further evidence to the 
theory, the samples were collected from a layer of peat that was carbon dated to 1908.61 
Researchers now estimate that the asteroid weighed 220-million pounds and sped toward 
Earth at 33,500 miles per hour—factors that caused surrounding air to heat and reach 
44,500 degrees Fahrenheit.62 This incredible heat caused the asteroid to consume itself, 
which also explains why there is no impact crater as the damage seen was due to the 
resulting shockwave.63 
                                                 
56 Hogenboom, “In Siberia in 1908.” 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 N. S. Vasilyev, “The Tunguska Meteorite Problem Today,” Planetary and Space Science 46, no. 2–
3 (1998): 130 accessed September 4, 2016, http://cecelia.physics.indiana.edu/life/meteorite/tunguska.html. 
60 Hogenboom, “In Siberia in 1908.” 
61 Ibid. 
62 “The Tunguska Impact,” NASA. 
63 Ibid. 
 14
C. THE CHELYABINSK IMPACT 
In 2013, without any warning, an asteroid entered the atmosphere and exploded 
over Chelyabinsk, Russia. Despite the fact that this event occurred in a more 
technologically advanced age than K-T or Tunguska, the asteroid was undetected and 
took the world, and Russia in particular, by surprise. The entry explosion of the meteor 
was “stronger than a nuclear explosion” and was picked up by monitoring stations in 
Antarctica.64 The meteor emanated a bright light that was seen by many citizens. 
Eyewitnesses reported a bright flash of light followed by a shock wave, which damaged 
buildings, shattered windows, and caused injuries to more than 1500 people.65  
A key difference between the Chelyabinsk event and the K-T and Tunguska NEO 
impacts is that it occurred in a densely human populated area. Two minutes elapsed from 
the time of the meteor entering the atmosphere to the shock wave that caused serious 
structural damage.66 Shattered windows caused great concern as outside temperatures 
were below -20 degrees Celsius.67 Obviously, these conditions negatively impacted the 
population, which had received no forewarning for the NEO. 
The meteor entered the atmosphere at approximately 9 AM and originated from 
the same direction as the rising sun, which is the main reason for the lack of forewarning. 
Neither a ground nor a space telescope could have registered the NEO because of its path 
of approach as the sun interferes with visual identification and radar.68 Either a new 
technology needs to be invented to monitor these NEOs, or better ground mitigation 
strategies should be in place. Ideally, both would be employed, but considering possible 
time and funding constraints associated with creating and testing new technology, a 
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ground-based mitigation impact scenario is more feasible in the near future. Overall, the 
Chelyabinsk event highlights a large gap in NEO tracking.  
D. NEO RESPONSE PRACTICES 
The examples reviewed above demonstrate that the threat of a NEO event is very 
real and suggest that both the international and domestic communities create an organized 
mitigation strategy to address this issue. Currently, both domestic and international 
communities have taken steps to research NEOs in order to better understand the 
potential threat and theorize ways to divert a NEO if needed. However, most of the 
mitigation strategies are space-based deflection scenarios rather than an earth-based 
response if a NEO impact is unavoidable. Similarly, the international community has also 
focused on the discovery and categorization of NEOs, but little in the way of a mitigation 
strategy has been formed. 
1. Domestic Response Practices  
NEO research and tracking is still relatively new, and formal searches did not start 
until the 1970s.69 Prior to that time, NEO identifications were only spontaneous 
discoveries and not the result of a concentrated effort.70 Throughout the 1980s, individual 
small university programs with better technology continued to discover NEOs, but these 
were small-scale efforts. The Palomar Observatory, located in California, tracked NEOs 
using a photographic telescope until 1994 when new technologies made their method 
obsolete. Larger efforts to research NEOs began in the 2000s and rose to a government 
level.  
In 1998, NASA representatives met with the House Committee on Science and 
agreed to head a project to find at least 90 percent of NEOs 1km and larger.71 That goal 
was met by 2010 on a small budget that averaged $4 million per year. Then, in 2005, the 
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U.S. Congress tasked the NASA to “discover, track, catalog, and characterize 90%” of 
NEOs greater than 140 m in diameter.72 The Near Earth Object Program, which was 
created to assist NASA with “detecting, tracking, and cataloging NEOs,” received 
approximately $4 million per year from 2002–2010.73 In 2014, that budget increased to 
$40 million per year due to increased concern from the scientific community. To date, 
this program has identified 14,510 NEOs, of which 1711 have been categorized as 
Potentially Hazardous Asteroids (PHAs).74 These findings of NEOs are passed along to 
the Minor Planet Center (MPC), located at the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory, 
where a comprehensive database of NEOs is maintained.75 The MPC is funded by 
NASA’s NEO Observations Program and acts as an international clearinghouse for NEO 
information.76 
In 2015, NASA and FEMA partnered to create the Planetary Impact Emergency 
Response Working Group (PIERWG) to address hazards associated with a potential NEO 
impact.77 In the event of an impending NEO impact, NASA would notify FEMA, which 
would then disseminate warnings to “Federal, State, and Local authorities, and 
emergency response institutions.”78 The PIERWG is in its nascent stage and has admitted 
that coordinating procedures and decision-making will be difficult due to sparse 
information on the threat.79  
In early 2016, NASA created the Planetary Defense Coordination Office (PDCO) 
in response to a 2014 report by the NASA Office of Inspector General (OIG), which 
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called for a more “efficient, effective, and transparent” program.80 In particular, the OIG 
called for the formalization of the NEO Program and the inclusion of a strategic plan.81 
The PDCO oversees “early detection of potentially hazardous objects (PHOs), tracking 
and characterizing PHOs and issuing warnings about potential impacts, providing timely 
and accurate communications, and performing as a lead coordination node in U.S. 
government planning for response to an actual impact threat.”82 The PDCO works in 
conjunction with NASA’s Near Earth Object Observations (NEOO) Program, the 
National Science Foundation (NSF), the Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL), the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the United States Air Force (USAF).83 
These organizations place an emphasis on the importance of communications and 
coordination, which are both aspects of disaster response that will be examined in the 
following case study chapters. 
More research has been done on space mitigation strategies than on Earth impact 
scenarios. A number of researchers agree that the most viable options for space deflection 
of a NEO are a kinetic impactor, a gravity tractor, or nuclear detonation.84 The nuclear 
option, while deemed the “most effective,” is also the most problematic. As stated in the 
previous chapter, it violates the terms of the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and 
Other Celestial Bodies, also known as the Outer Space Treaty, and the 1963 Limited Test 
Ban Treaty.85 These restrictions bring attention to the fact that international coordination 
is necessary for forming a reasonable NEO mitigation plan.  
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2. International Response Practices 
In 2001, a UN assembled team, known as the Commission on the Peaceful Uses 
of Outer Space (COPUOUS), was tasked to come up with recommendations for an 
international response to a NEO impact threat. The team proposed that the first step 
would be to identify the objects and assess the risk of impact to Earth.86 The creation of 
IAWN and the Space Mission Planning Advisory Group (SMPAG) were the answer to 
that recommendation. IAWN’s mission is to “establish a worldwide effort to detect, 
track, and physically characterize NEOs, to determine those that are potential impact 
threats to Earth.”87 Membership includes “scientific institutions, observatories, and other 
interested parties,” that then analyze the possibility of an impact event and its potential 
effects.88 SMPAG’s mission is to organize an international response plan for a NEO 
threat and is overseen by the European Space Agency (ESA).89 
In Europe, ESA addresses space-related issues, including NEO research. ESA is 
composed of 22 member states, which allows the agency greater financial capabilities to 
tackle large-scale projects, including the NEO threat. Specifically, ESA’s Space 
Situational Awareness (SSA) program, which was created in 2009, leads NEO research 
efforts. The SSA mission is to “support Europe’s independent utilization of, and access 
to, space through the provision of timely and accurate information and data regarding the 
space environment, and particularly hazards to infrastructure in orbit and on the ground” 
including the hazards associated with a NEO impact event.90 
The ESA SSA NEO Program aims to monitor NEO trajectories, predict potential 
impacts, “assess consequences of any possible impact,” and create deflection plans and 
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impact warnings.91 Data are collected from a comprehensive network of European 
sources, including professional and amateur astronomers. This information is then 
forwarded to the U.S. MPC for cataloging. In addition, the SSA NEO Coordination 
Center processes the data in order to determine if there are any “high risk impact 
predictions.”92 In the event that a high-risk impact prediction is made, the ESA SSA 
reaches out to JPL for confirmation, prior to the issuance of warnings.93 This 
coordination between entities is important as it leads to a more robust and accurate 
picture of the NEO threat. The theme of coordination will also be prevalent in the 
following case study chapters that examine disaster responses to other HILP events. 
China, one of the leading space powers, has not coordinated with other space 
programs in addressing the NEO threat, and scant information on its program is available. 
China started its own asteroid program, the Beijing Schmidt CCD Asteroid Program 
(SCAP), in 1995.94 For reference, the Schmidt CCD is a type of advanced telescope 
named after its creator.95 This specialized NEO telescope at the Beijing Astronomical 
Observatory (BAO) assists in NEO tracking. SCAP discovers and tracks NEOs while 
also providing information to the MPC.96 SCAP’s other objective is to calculate NEO 
impact probability.97 Ultimately, China does not allow for as much transparency 
regarding its NEO research efforts as the United States.  
E. CONCLUSION 
Despite the alarming effects of the K-T, Tunguska, and Chelyabinsk impacts, 
little has been done to create a response strategy for the threat. The United States and the 
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international community have taken steps to address the NEO hazard, but these efforts 
fall short of creating a holistic NEO strategy that includes greater global participation. 
Furthermore, government officials do not give explicit details outlining agency roles in 
the event of a NEO impact. The following chapters will review other, more known threats 















III. LESSONS FROM VOLCANIC ERUPTIONS 
Volcanic eruptions are difficult to predict and can pose a threat to people and 
infrastructure, much like a NEO impact. Since there have been many more volcanic 
eruptions than NEO events in recorded history, the application of some of the established 
volcano disaster management protocols could offer a foundation for a NEO event 
strategy. This chapter examines two volcano case studies, the 1980 eruption of Mount St. 
Helens and the 2010 eruption of Eyjafjallajökull in Iceland. Each case study will include 
a brief background section, followed by the mitigation strategies employed by officials 
that focus on education and training, infrastructure, and communications. 
A. MOUNT ST. HELENS ERUPTION 
Mount St. Helens, in Washington State, is known as one of the Cascade Arc 
Volcanoes, a series of volcanoes clustered along the Cascade Mountains starting in 
Northern California and extending to British Columbia.98 When it erupted in 1980, it 
caused the deaths of 57 people, and became what one expert described as “one of the 
most studied volcanic eruptions in the twentieth century.”99   
In the months leading to the eruption on May 18, 1980, thousands of small 
earthquakes occurred at the base of Mount St. Helens.100 Based on the seismic activity 
noted by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), the U.S. Forest Service took measures 
months before the eruption to identify the potential hazard and limit loss of life by 
closing off Mount St. Helens above the timberline.101 Unfortunately, the public did 
not heed the roadblocks and took the potential threat lightly. Ultimately, a magnitude 
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5 earthquake shook the mountain in the early morning hours and caused a simultaneous 
landslide along the “volcano’s northern bulge.”102 In the immediate aftermath of the 
earthquake, the information on the threat was not presented to the public by the media or 
by government agencies in a way that emphasized the severe impact of a volcanic event. 
Even after a state of emergency was declared in April and the National Guard offered 
enforcement assistance, locals continued to disregard the warnings. Some locals even 
began selling maps of the logging roads in the area, which allowed tourists to avoid the 
roadblocks.103 Even so, researchers estimated that the roadblocks saved as many as 
100,000 lives.104 
The landslide became, according to the USGS, the “largest debris avalanche on 
Earth in recorded history,” expelling debris that could have filled “1 million Olympic 
swimming pools.”105 It also caused the loss of the cryptodome, a blockage of 
accumulated viscous magma, from the inside of the volcano.106 This action resulted in 
depressurization within the volcano and in a “lateral blast” that removed 1,000 ft. off the 
top of Mount St. Helens. 
The loss of the cryptodome and lateral blast caused extensive damage to the 
surrounding area. A dense population of trees spread over 150,000 acres was felled.107 
The 520 million tons of volcanic ash that resulted from the eruption spread eastward and 
caused “complete darkness in Spokane, Washington, 400 kilometers (250 miles) from the 
volcano.”108 Ash fell as far as central Montana and in the Great Plains of the Central  
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United States, more than 900 miles away from the eruption site.109 In three days, the 
Mount St. Helens ash cloud spread across the United States, and in 15 days, it had circled 
the Earth.110  
The ash from a volcano can be particularly dangerous for a number of reasons. 
For example, it can bury roads, buildings, and houses. The ash cloud is comprised of rock 
fragments, minerals, and volcanic glass. It is “hard, abrasive, mildly corrosive, conducts 
electricity when wet, and does not dissolve in water.”111 Ash accumulation can cause 
roof collapse or other structural damage.112 Aircraft that encounter the ash cloud can lose 
engine power, a serious problem for commercial carriers or rescue operations. If the ash 
contaminates the water supply, it can cause a shortage of potable water for citizens. Ash 
can also cause “damage at hydroelectric facilities, irrigation pumping stations, sewage-
treatment facilities, and storm water systems.”113 Some of these issues were seen in the 
1980 eruption of Mount St. Helens. 
As also was demonstrated by the Mount St. Helens eruption, during a natural 
disaster when water is compromised providing a clean water supply is critical. Volcanic 
ash contamination of the water supply and the need to ensure water availability in the 
event of a fire forced the establishment of water rationing systems on communities. The 
method of rationing varied by area. In the aftermath, an increased demand for water led 
the city of Ellensburg, Washington, to double its water usage by 2.5 times the average for 
four days.114 This increased water usage was due to ash clean-up activities. Luckily, 
supplies of uncontaminated well water were available for some communities downwind 
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of the eruption, without which the “demand would have exceeded supply to a much 
greater extent.”115  
Wastewater also became an issue due to the ash fall. At the Yakima water 
treatment plant, “15 times the usual amount of solid matter was being removed” during 
the pre-treatment stage.116 In the following days, the ash clogged the machinery at the 
treatment plant and plugged the lines.117 Three days after the eruption, the Yakima city 
manager issued a press release about a system failure at the Yakima sewage-treatment 
plant. Damage to the plant ultimately cost approximately $4 million.118 Local and state 
officials took steps to ensure that a more cohesive plan for water safety was in place for 
future eruption incidents. 
Transportation is another important area of that was negatively impacted by the 
ash fall from Mount St. Helens. A number of eastern Washington airports were shut 
down due to poor visibility and ash accumulation. Thousands of flights were either 
grounded or re-routed during the two-week shutdown.119 Roadways that were not 
damaged or destroyed had to be closed “due to visibility and traction issues for vehicles,” 
and most did not open for another two weeks.120 The USGS noted that 185 miles of road 
were “destroyed or extensively damaged” because of the eruption.121 In addition, 
48 bridges were damaged or destroyed.  
The damage to transportation infrastructure was caused by pyroclastic flows, 
lahars, and ash fall. Pyroclastic flows are a “chaotic mixture of rock fragments, gas, and 
ash that travels rapidly (ten meters per second) away from the volcanic vent or collapsing 
flow front”122 while lahars are volcanic or debris mudflow. Pyroclastic flows and lahars 
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from Mount St. Helens left over 6 feet of debris along roads near Mount St. Helens. 
However, the most important factor became the removal of the ash. 
After the 1980 eruption, electrical circuits and transformers were temporarily 
damaged by the ash fall. A week later, rainfall hit the area and power shorted out once 
again due to the combination of the weight of the wet ash causing “insulator 
flashover.”123 The flashovers caused numerous fires due to the flammable nature of the 
wooden utility poles. Researchers found that “The Bonneville Power Administration 
(BPA), which transmits electricity across much of the Pacific Northwest, experienced 
25 momentary and 25 sustained outages in the initial 10 days following the eruption.”124 
Central Washington was not prepared when Mount St. Helens erupted in 1980, 
much like the United States is ill-prepared for a NEO impact, and the lessons learned 
from the disastrous eruption could be invaluable for creating a U.S. NEO mitigation 
strategy. In particular, these lessons focus on the areas of education and training, 
infrastructure protection, and communications. The location of Mount St. Helens puts it 
in the jurisdiction of the United States, offering insight into how the various state and 
local governments assign and share duties. In the case of Mount St. Helens, despite the 
long lead-up to the eruption, the public was widely uninformed and uneducated about the 
issue, and emergency personnel were not prepared for the level of interagency 
cooperation needed to address these issues. Furthermore, the public and government 
officials were uncertain of the effects of the ash cloud on infrastructure and health, but 
they learned a great deal in the aftermath of the eruption. The effects of the ash cloud on 
wildlife, the population, and infrastructure can offer a wealth of knowledge, as a NEO 
impact would cause a similar debris cloud. Officials also recognized that creating a 
communications strategy that emphasizes key impacts to citizens can result in more 
cooperation during a natural disaster. The public needs to be aware of the threat 
beforehand, which can be accomplished by disseminating information among both 
civilians and relevant aid groups.  
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1. Citizen Education and Training 
After the 1980 eruption of Mount St. Helens, disaster management officials 
identified weak areas of response and worked to strengthen a pre-event preparation 
strategy. The ash fall from Mount St. Helens caused the most concern due to its far- 
reaching negative impacts. Citizens of the area are now more informed of the risk of a 
volcanic eruption, and since the incident, the focus has been on education and 
preparedness. Charles Erwin, emergency management specialist for the city of Yakima, 
recommends emergency supply kits for residents and stresses the importance of including 
dust masks and goggles to help in the event of ash fall.125 According to Erwin, nearby 
cities now have plans in place for clearing and disposing of the ash from streets, and 
“how to answer citizens’ questions about what to do with it.”126 This emphasis on taking 
time to educate and empower is important because it directly involves citizens in the 
mitigation strategy.  
Disaster management training is another important component in improving 
preparedness and responses during all phases of a disaster.127 Before the 1980 eruption, 
training drills were not a regular event for a volcano response team. This lack of training 
in 1980 endangered the lives of citizens, isolated response groups because of limited 
communications, and created confusion about the effects of ash fall. Doug Ficco, a 
maintenance engineer with the Washington state Department of Transportation, notes that 
“multi-agency drills are [now] part of the routine,” whereas before the disaster, 
Washington “didn’t have relationships in place with the Corps of Engineers and the 
National Guard.”128 The eruption revealed the need for training among the various 
agencies, which ultimately enhanced collaboration and also shed light on potential 
weaknesses of the mitigation strategy.  
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Investment in volcano monitoring technology that can help notify and educate the 
community was another outcome from the 1980 eruption.129 The Johnston Ridge 
Observatory is run by the USGS and now has more robust monitoring and informational 
capabilities. The observatory’s website, a technology unavailable in 1980, is easy to 
navigate, and it is informative, and regularly updated. Researchers at the observatory 
closely monitor volcanic activity on the mountain, issue forecasts, disseminate warnings, 
and spearhead studies to more fully understand the eruptive threat.130 Investing in 
technology to understand and monitor the threat helps create more understanding for first 
responders, who can then adjust their mitigation plans accordingly. These changes to 
protocol demonstrate that researchers are now more focused on the hazards of an eruption 
and on monitoring the threat in real time.  
2. Infrastructure Mitigation 
Strong infrastructure is necessary for a population to successfully operate, yet it 
was compromised in the 1980 eruption of Mount St. Helens. Reinforcing and building 
infrastructure is one of the main priorities for the National Volcano Early Warning 
System (NVEWS), of which the Cascades Volcano Observatory is a member. NVEWS 
was created by the USGS after the eruption and “guides strategic, long-term 
improvements to U.S. volcano monitoring infrastructure and integrated volcano hazard 
information products and services for a range of users, including emergency managers, 
land managers, communities, businesses, other Federal and State agencies, and the 
public.”131 Including such a wide spectrum of stakeholders allows for these individuals to 
create better practices and stronger infrastructure in the event of an eruption.  
The abundance of ash fall greatly impacted the surrounding communities and 
their equipment. Maintenance lessons were as simple as covering the external equipment 
with plastic. Workers also noted that pre-treatment equipment controls would have to be 
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adjusted for “maximum removal rates” to accommodate the excess ash.132 Public health 
officials and citizens would also need to be informed of the potential consequences of ash 
in the water systems.133 Lastly, collaborative efforts would include contacting equipment 
manufacturers for assistance in maintaining or repairing equipment.134 
Ash removal and disposal was an arduous but important task after the eruption. 
Dump sites were chosen based on proximity due to the urgency of removing the 
debris.135 Some examples of chosen dump sites were quarries or landfills. These areas 
were then “covered with topsoil and seeded with grass” to minimize the chance that wind 
would cause the ash to become airborne again.136 Ultimately, the cost of ash removal 
totaled $2.2 million, and it took Yakima over two months to finish.137 The biggest lesson 
learned for ash removal was to identify disposal sites prior to an eruption and to 
disseminate that site information to all stakeholders and have “residents, businesses, and 
utilities coordinate their activities.”138 
Ash from an eruption can also have negative implications for the power grid. The 
immediate removal of ash is integral to maintaining the power supply. For example, ash 
accumulation of .6 inches “can cause flashover on insulators on power lines, resulting in 
power loss.”139 Air blasting can be used to clear dry ash from surfaces, but wet ash can 
only be successfully removed through high pressure water.140 Small measures such as 
providing regular maintenance to equipment can also provide more stability to the power 
grid in a time of crisis. Consistently clearing ash from trees near power lines is one 
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measure that can help to keep power outages at a minimum. If power is kept on, people 
are less likely to panic and responders are better able to continue their mitigation efforts.  
3. Communications Lessons Learned 
The communications issue extends to disseminating emergency information to the 
public as well as among relevant agencies and stakeholders when responding to a 
disaster. In the case of Mount St. Helens, warning and informing the public fell to the 
State of Washington Department of Emergency Services. The service was 
“underfunded,” “neglected,” and “directed by an inexperienced political appointee rather 
than a hazards professional.”141 The department issued a warning to local communities 
hours after the eruption occurred, and ultimately a federal disaster was declared. FEMA 
stepped in and issued a series of fact sheets to answer a number of questions for the 
public. This information could have been more effective if it had been issued in the 
weeks and months before the eruption, when the USGS first noticed the increased activity 
on Mount St. Helens.142  
It is important to tailor communications in a way that encourages the public to 
understand the threat and take appropriate action, but not panic. The U.S. Forest Service 
did an admirable job of keeping citizens out of harm’s way using roadblocks, setting up 
an information office, and “developing a contingency plan for an eruption” and worked 
massive amounts of overtime trying to keep ahead of the situation, but the public did not 
understand the threat.143 It was only in the aftermath that people started to understand the 
gravity of the situation when the ash cloud, which many people believed was an 
approaching storm system, closed roads, stranded cars, and caused health concerns. After 
the eruption, both civilians and emergency personnel understood the risks associated with 
a volcanic event more thoroughly, encouraging the warning system, predictions, and 
public communications to become “more effective.”144 
                                                 





B. EYJAFJALLAJÖKULL ERUPTION 
On April 14, 2010, Eyjafjallajökull, an Icelandic volcano largely unknown to 
most of the world, erupted with severe consequences to both Europe and the world. 
Thanks to advances in telecommunications since the 1980 St. Helens eruption, the 
impacts of this volcanic eruption were televised to an international audience, 24 hours a 
day. Eyjafjallajökull was an eye-opening event for the public and governments across 
Europe.145 
Eyjafjallajökull’s initial eruption on March 20, 2010, produced lava on the north-
east side of the volcano, and soon after another eruption phase started near the caldera, or 
volcanic crater, causing the surrounding ice to melt and flood southern Iceland.146 
Researchers found that approximately 25 percent of the 1 cubic kilometer of “ice in the 
summit crater…melted in the first two days of the eruption.” The resulting combination 
of magma and water caused an ash cloud that reached over 33,000 feet into the 
atmosphere. The ash cloud, pushed by wind, spread toward the “Faroe Islands, Norway, 
and northern Scotland.”147 Researchers estimated that the volcano produced eruptions of 
approximately 750 tons of magma every second, causing most of the crater ice to melt.148 
Activity seemed to decrease by the end of April, but it was not until May 23rd that ash 
fall decreased to almost nothing.149  
Due to the location of Iceland in the middle of trans-Atlantic flight channels, and 
the effects of drifting ash on European countries downwind of the volcano, the ash cloud 
caused the greatest impact to air transportation.150 During the week of April 15, dozens 
of countries closed their airports, totaling 300 airport closures, and “a correspondingly 
large airspace” was also restricted. At one point during the eruption, almost 80 percent of 
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flights in Europe were canceled due to airport closures.151 According to the USGS, 
7 million passengers were affected by the closure, 100,000 flights were cancelled, and 
$1.7 billion in airline revenue was lost.152 The grounded flights and delays almost 
resulted in medical emergencies for some. As an example, transport of bone marrow from 
the United States for recipients in Europe was delayed, which caused great concern as 
bone marrow is only viable for transplant within 72 hours.153  
During the 2010 eruption, officials were uncertain of what constituted safe ash 
levels for aircraft, which ultimately caused mass airport closures. In hindsight, a clearer 
understanding of safe and unsafe ash levels for aviation would have been useful in 
making airport closure decisions. Instead, decisions were made using a risk-aversive 
approach versus one based on scientific data.154 The event offered researchers an 
opportunity to learn more about ash clouds.  
The United Kingdom led the airport closure response after information from the 
International Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW) was disseminated. Other European 
countries, from Russia to Italy, emulated the United Kingdom’s decision and closed their 
airports. The intent was to avert risk and ensure the safety of human lives, but “the 
response was purely reactive.”155 The United Kingdom’s 2010 edition of the National 
Risk Register made no mention of a volcanic ash cloud event, and therefore no real 
conception of the potential hazards of a “volcanic ash aviation emergency” existed.156 
The UK uses an emergency management system that classifies a crisis into “bronze,” 
“silver,” “gold,” “diamond,” and “platinum.”157 These colors are the signifiers for the 
level of leadership and strategy necessary to oversee a crisis. The top tiers, “diamond” 
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and “platinum,” translate to the involvement of the Prime Minister in the Cabinet Office 
Briefing Room (COBRA).158 It was four days before the first COBRA meeting 
convened, which shows “a lack of visible leadership” when many stakeholders were 
floundering in the midst of the crisis.159 Decision makers executed a piecemeal approach 
that led certain countries to be more decisive and others to simply follow their tenuous 
lead.160 
The 2010 eruption of Eyjafjallajökull impacted most of Europe, and officials 
worked to form a mitigation plan in the midst of the crisis, which ultimately left them 
with a number of lessons learned. The unpredictable nature of the volcano and the 
ensuing ash cloud caused a large-scale air transportation shutdown in Europe. Officials 
worked to create a mitigation strategy that focused on the areas of education and training, 
infrastructure, and communications. 
This case study can serve as a model for how best to respond to an event that 
gives little forewarning and can have significant impact, such as a NEO. More 
specifically, ash fall and a debris cloud are two major concerns with a NEO event. In 
addition, studying an international response gives insight especially into how the 
coordination of numerous states can be improved during a crisis. Knowledge on the 
dispersion and effects of an ash cloud, such as the one produced by Eyjafjallajökull, has 
researchers calling for an emphasis on education. No protocols existed at the time of the 
eruption for an aviation ash cloud event. Furthermore, infrastructure was severely 
strained because of the ash cloud and resulting airport closures. This meant aviation 
limits for an ash cloud exposure were unknown during the most critical times. 
Researchers found that much was lacking in the communications strategy that was 
employed during the eruption, which resulted in a lack of public understanding of the 
threat. A great deal of this misunderstanding and inaccurate information stemmed from 
the lack of coordination between airlines and officials. Also, many of the aid 
organizations were not active in the social media world, which left a large community 
                                                 




without the information that only those organizations could provide.161 Application of 
these lessons could be useful in constructing a comprehensive mitigation strategy for a 
NEO impact. 
1. Domestic Response 
Iceland’s sparse population, small size, and close proximity to other European 
countries combined with the widespread impact of the eruption’s ash cloud caused the 
response to be largely international. As previously mentioned, Great Britain took the lead 
in crisis management due to its “proximity” and the effects of the ash cloud on its 
territory.162 However, one of the domestic measures Iceland took was monitoring the 
volcano. The Icelandic Meteorological Office (IMO) monitors and records activity that 
may signal danger from an impending eruption. Observations are executed 24 hours a day 
and staff is on call at all hours.163 
Approximately 500 locals, mostly farmers, were evacuated due to their close 
proximity to the volcano. The ash cloud caused poor visibility and the closure of 
surrounding roadways. Authorities cautioned farmers about ash contamination of the 
water supply and emphasized the health risks posed to livestock, especially sheep, who 
drank it. The surrounding international community experienced the greatest threat 
because of the ash cloud trajectory, which significantly increased the international 
response. 
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2. International Response 
The 2010 eruption of Eyjafjallajökull opened the world’s eyes to the havoc a 
volcano could cause in the modern world.164 Piero Dellino, volcanologist with the 
University of Bari, commented, “our complex society is not prepared to face natural 
hazards…we have to therefore learn from this lesson.”165 Prior to the 2010 eruption of 
Eyjafjallajökull, little had been written about the “organizational, logistical, risk 
management, and decision-making processes associated with volcanic ash emergencies 
for aviation.”166 As previously mentioned, the United Kingdom, which took the lead in 
the crisis, had published a new edition of its National Risk Register in 2010, but offered 
no protocol for a volcanic ash aviation emergency.167 
The need for technological and scientific advances enables better real-time 
monitoring of “the content and concentration of fine ash in the eruption cloud.”168 Along 
those lines, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) created a global 
Volcanic Ash Advisory Center (VAAC) in 1986 with the purpose of determining “the 
locations and movements of ash clouds in the atmosphere.”169 There are nine VAAC 
centers that receive the bulk of their data from civilian meteorological satellites.170 The 
information is then used to create an “atmospheric dispersion model” that will predict 
cloud trajectories.171 The VAAC then issues advisories called SIGMETs (SIGnificant 
METeorological information) to “inform airline dispatchers, pilots, and air-traffic 
managers of hazardous weather-related hazards, including ash clouds.”172 The advisories 
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are regularly updated “over time periods of minutes to hours” and posted on websites.173 
These real-time updates can be invaluable when monitoring an ash cloud and ensuring 
aviation safety. VAAC was instrumental during the Eyjafjallajökull eruption as aviation 
was largely impacted. 
New measures and protocols were created after the Eyjafjallajökull eruption when 
officials realized their previous strategy did not account for the volatility and 
unpredictability of nature.174 After the crisis, a risk regulation expert noted, “EU 
integration does not yet extend to air traffic management.”175 The disconnected response 
strategies across Europe made the task of mitigating the problem and informing the 
public more difficult.176 
The eruption triggered a new awareness in Europe about the hazards of ash clouds 
on aviation as well as the need for policy. ICAO met later that year to discuss the aviation 
issues and establish new policy for aviation volcanic ash events. One of the outcomes 
from the ICAO meeting was a regional contingency plan in the event of a volcanic ash 
disruption.177 The plan provides important information on what ash levels are hazardous 
as well as when “bulletins” should be issued to “aviation personnel, including pilots.”178 
The intent is to disseminate accurate information quickly and efficiently to those who 
would be most impacted by the ash.  
Another outcome of Eyjafjallajökull’s eruption and the resulting air disaster was 
the formation of a new group called the International Volcanic Ash Task Force (IVATF). 
ICAO appointed the group to “examine how best to define hazardous airspace and 
manage aviation risk.”179 Members include stakeholders from both the government and 
private sector who are involved in “regulation, operations, and scientific 
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investigations.”180 This partnership, between both public and private sector groups, 
allows for a more comprehensive plan. The 2010 eruption drastically impacted aviation, 
so involving all stakeholders in the IVATF is a prudent decision that will foster 
communication between states, will lead to more decisiveness among leaders, and 
promote greater understanding before the next event occurs.  
Communications play an important role for both public and private sector entities 
during an event such as Eyjafjallajökull’s eruption. In this case, the number of airspace 
stakeholders created issues for communicating clearly and comprehensively. Airspace 
ownership is a complex issue as there are “many organizations and initiatives that have a 
stake in managing access.”181 After the eruption, various regulating entities were 
fragmented on the issue of regulating European skies.182 Because of this 
disconnectedness, Eurocontrol focused on fast-tracking the Single European Sky 
initiative. This initiative would “coordinate the management and regulation of airspace 
across Europe.”183 Single European Sky moderates airspace by “functional blocks” rather 
than by national borders.184 This system increases efficiency and would result in a “faster 
coordinated response in a crisis.”185 
Real-time information and reporting is another practice that can be employed for 
future eruption events. ICAO recommended that the Volcano Observatories use a 
notification system to alert the aviation sector about volcanic activity. A color coded 
system was created in response to the recommendation. The system provides information 
on volcanic activity, whether it is increasing or decreasing, and as of 2013 is used by a 
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number of Volcano Observatories in the “United States, Russian Federation, New 
Zealand, Iceland, and…Australia.”186 
Communicating risk to the public is another important component that is integral 
after a HILP event. Effective communications during a crisis foster “credibility and 
legitimacy, which may determine the effectiveness of actions taken to manage any 
current crisis and prepare for future ones.”187 After the eruption, researchers found that 
giving the public in-depth, scientific knowledge of the event and its risks would have 
been helpful.188 Unfortunately, this was not what happened during the 2010 ash cloud 
event and “scientists, weather forecasters, engineers and other experts need to be given a 
greater voice in the traditional media.”189 The effects of this kind of communication can 
keep the public from panicking, build confidence in the decision-making, and create 
interest in the issue.190 In addition, providing solid information keeps people from 
attempting to find their own online, which can be inaccurate and spread quickly through 
social media. 
Researchers found that during the 2010 eruption, “pre-established internal and 
external communication plans were essential; and that in future they should be 
implemented as part of an organization’s overall travel policy and crisis management 
plans.”191 The growing popularity of social media platforms being used for quick sound 
bites of news continues, and it only makes sense that officials use every avenue available 
for disseminating information. Social networks are powerful tools, “a network of 
networks,” with the ability to reach a greater audience. Research has shown that bloggers 
are more likely to use information found online through a social network due to the ease 
of being notified about the story.192 One key component for a successful communications 
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strategy is to establish a social media presence before an event occurs to build public 
trust. This approach allows the organization to become the “go to” for information during 
an actual crisis rather than having the conversation dominated by another, less credible 
source as was the case in 2010 when the travel industry drowned out the more informed 
voices of scientists and air traffic control.193 
C. CONCLUSION 
Both case studies in this chapter shared some similarities while still offering 
unique recommendations. For example, both case studies highlight the importance of 
educating citizens and officials about the event before it happens. The Mount St. Helens 
case offered practical lessons for securing infrastructure and lifeline services. 
Eyjafjallajökull’s eruption gave officials insight into the impact volcanic ash fall can have 
on travel, particularly on air transportation. Both case studies also outlined the need for 
increased communications between agencies and accurate updates to citizens. However, 
since the Mount St. Helens eruption occurred well before the social media age, 
Eyjafjallajökull offered new insight into the role that this media can play during a crisis. 
These conclusions will help to strengthen the volcano mitigation strategy for each 
location, and many recommendations could be used for forming a NEO mitigation 
strategy.  
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IV. LESSONS FROM EARTHQUAKE CASE STUDIES 
This chapter examines two major earthquake events: the case of the 1989 Loma 
Prieta Earthquake in California will be examined first, followed by the 2011 Great East 
Japan Earthquake. Both were large impact events that hit populations familiar with this 
type of threat, but valuable lessons were learned and incorporated into future mitigation 
strategies. Each case will include a short overview of the eruption, and its effects, 
followed by lessons learned in the areas of education and training, infrastructure, and 
communications.   
A. LOMA PRIETA EARTHQUAKE 
In 1989, San Francisco and the surrounding Bay Area experienced a 6.9 
magnitude earthquake that caused mass destruction in a densely populated area.194 The 
quake originated at Loma Prieta Peak in the nearby Santa Cruz Mountains, and although 
lasting only for 15 seconds, was felt as far away as Los Angeles.195 The Marina district, 
in San Francisco, experienced the most damage as its buildings had been constructed on 
filled land. Filled land is land that has been built up from wetlands and along shorelines 
by filling it in with another material, such as loose rocks; in the case of the Marina district 
the infill was with “dune sand and building rubble” from the 1906 San Francisco 
Earthquake.196 The unstable sand provided poor support for building foundations during 
the earthquake, causing the structures to collapse;197 a total of 67 people died and 3,000 
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were injured as a result.198 The majority of deaths were caused when a 1.25 mile section 
of the Cypress Street Viaduct collapsed onto its lower level.199 The earthquake also 
caused fires due to damaged gas mains.200 The Loma Prieta Earthquake resulted in $6 
billion in damages and was the “most costly natural disaster in the United States” since 
the 1906 earthquake in San Francisco.201 
The Loma Prieta Earthquake caused substantial damage to infrastructure 
including roads, bridges, water mains, and the power grid, which hindered aid efforts. It 
caused power loss to over 150,000 people and based on the current population, the loss 
would be close to 500,000.202 Power loss results in the loss of critical services, or 
“lifelines,” when they are most needed.203 During the earthquake, the collapse of the 
Cypress Street Viaduct ultimately resulted in the death of 35 people.204 Before the event, 
earthquake engineers requested that the City of Oakland update the viaduct according to 
the latest safety code.205 Officials stated that the collapse could have been avoided if the 
recommended safety updates had been made.206 
Ultimately, the Loma Prieta earthquake caused losses to lifeline infrastructure 
systems, though a great deal was learned from these impacts. Losses resulted in 
information that was used to improve the resilience of critical systems, which are 
essential for any disaster, such as a NEO impact. Preparing for an unpredictable threat, 
such as an earthquake or a NEO, can limit the loss of life and infrastructure destruction. 
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1. Education and Training 
Citizens of California are accustomed to the threat of earthquakes and receive 
education as early as grade school on what to do in the event of a quake. This method of 
educating early and often is especially important so that in a time of crisis, the response is 
automatic. For example, during the 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake, “effective training of 
staff and students in emergency procedures” ensured that no student, teacher, or 
administrator was seriously injured during the event.207 Earthquake drills are practiced 
during the school year, and both children and adults memorize “drop, cover, and hold on” 
as the actions one takes in the midst of a quake.208 After the 1989 earthquake, researchers 
Linda Bourque and James Goltz studied the citizen response during and after the event. 
Their survey showed that 75 percent of respondents stopped what they were doing and 
took cover.209 People who were in familiar places such as at work, school, or home 
followed the “drop, cover and hold on” protocol, whereas people in public spaces were 
disoriented and did not perform the safety protocol.210 The latter response shows a need 
for revised training that teaches “how to scan and quickly assess a location for safety” 
and how to keep individuals from being a danger to themselves or those nearby during a 
crisis.211 The Bay Area Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) has since increased the 
frequency of drill and training exercises in the region. For example, in 2011, the UASI 
spent $3.3 million on training exercises and increased the annual number of responders 
trained from 500 to 1200.212 These responders hailed from different areas of disaster 
management such as “emergency management, emergency medical services, firefighting, 
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law enforcement, and hazardous materials response,” thereby creating a more educated 
and versatile response team.213 
Today, the FEMA website offers information on earthquake protocol for adults 
and children. In addition, a massive drill called the “Great California Shakeout” started in 
2015 and occurs annually on the anniversary of the 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake. More 
than 10 million Californians registered and participated in the first drill.214 Linking the 
drill to the 1989 earthquake makes a connection in the minds of many who experienced 
the quake firsthand. The effort, which is sponsored by FEMA, USGS, and NSF, also 
offers drill manuals for various groups such as schools, businesses, non-profit 
organizations, disabled persons, government agencies, and the healthcare industry.215 
Emergency disaster response teams were strained during the 1989 earthquake, and 
practices were later revised. The current earthquake response strategy is very different 
than the one employed in 1989.216 For example, the updated strategy was tested in an 
annual “Golden Guardian” statewide exercise in 2013.217 During the drill, the 
Department of Emergency Management (DEM) worked closely with FEMA and the U.S. 
Navy on communicating and coordinating a citywide recovery for a scenario wherein a 
magnitude 7.8 earthquake hit San Francisco.218  
2. Infrastructure Mitigation 
After the earthquake, officials recognized the importance of reinforcing 
infrastructures for critical organizations, buildings, and roads. The California Utilities 
Emergency Association works with utility companies on the interdependencies between 
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systems and on the establishment of protocols to keep systems running, or to get them 
back online in the event of a disaster.219 The association has also worked with utility 
companies in other California regions to establish mutual assistance agreements in the 
event of a magnitude 7.0 earthquake.220 Boland notes, “the type of system we have for 
pulling resources from elsewhere did not exist during Loma Prieta … the utilities realize 
they are no longer silos and are working together.”221 By increasing the level of 
coordinated training among groups, the level of preparedness increases as more resources 
are available in the event of a crisis. 
After the earthquake, the collapsed viaduct was redesigned with the updated 
safety protocols. The updates involved retrofitting columns with steel plates and using 
rubber isolators to minimize earthquake vibrations.222 Experts concluded that the reason 
the viaduct was so impacted by the earthquake was due to “a lack of knowledge and 
understanding of the geotechnical area” and a lack of compliance with engineer 
suggestions for safety upgrades.223 Reinforcing infrastructure can greatly reduce the odds 
of buildings collapsing and limit debris falling on people. 
3. Communications Lessons Learned 
Since the 1989 earthquake, new communications technology has also become 
available and been incorporated into the mitigation strategy. For example, the Emergency 
Operations Center relies on a WebEOC “incident management tool for situational 
awareness” to further facilitate communication between the disaster management groups, 
which was a technology unavailable during the 1989 earthquake.224 This system might 
have addressed the problem in 1989 when “there were major difficulties with 
interorganizational communication” as the various agencies were communicating on a 
                                                 
219 Raths, “7 Ways the Response to a Devastating Earthquake Has Changed.”  
220 Ibid. 
221 Ibid. 
222 “Cypress Street Viaducts,” Engineering.com. 
223 Ibid. 
224 Rich, “Major Earthquake Scenario.” 
 44
number of different radio frequencies.225 Employing a uniform system increases 
communications among groups and enables the dissemination of accurate information. 
In 1991, a law was passed in California that requires a formal “incident command 
system” during disasters that provides clarity and “facilitate[s] the flow of emergency 
information and resources within and between the organizational levels.”226 This 
structure allows seasoned disaster management officials to make critical decisions, rather 
than directing them to the mayor.227 Having a clear protocol during a disaster is 
imperative for making timely decisions and executing rescue operations. 
Since 1989, the USGS has partnered with the American Red Cross and the United 
Way in creating earthquake hazard messages for citizens and other aid groups. 
Pamphlets, published in multiple languages, were initially disseminated to 2 million 
people via the Sunday morning newspaper.228 Due to their popularity, the pamphlets 
were reissued in 1994, and over 5 million copies have since been distributed.229 Officials 
in other earthquake-prone areas have created their own information bulletins and 
modeled them after the USGS version. 
The USGS also routinely provides earthquake information to news stations to 
ensure that accurate messages are aired. This media outreach is particularly important as 
one of the findings from the 1989 earthquake was that the media portrayed the event as 
being worse than it was by initially inflating fatalities and only showing the massive 
destruction of the Marina district. First responders in surrounding areas were misled by 
these media reports, which resulted in them not requesting aid and resources from nearby 
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communities.230 Ensuring accurate disaster information is important to both first 
responders and citizens during a crisis. 
Social media has become an increasingly popular resource for officials and the 
public during a crisis, but it was not available during the 1989 earthquake. Today, the San 
Francisco DEM has established a social media presence across various platforms and is 
working to incorporate it into a response strategy. For example, now San Francisco uses 
Twitter to publish warnings and status updates. AlertSF, a text-based notification system 
for San Franciscans, also sends emergency alerts to area residents on events ranging from 
traffic accidents to “citywide post-disaster information.”231 
B. GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE 
On March 11, 2011, a 9.0 earthquake shook the seafloor of the Pacific Ocean for 
six minutes, sending tsunami waves as high as 128 feet to strike Tokohu, Japan, and 
leaving a lasting impact on citizens.232 The earthquake was the strongest ever recorded to 
hit Japan, causing the deaths of thousands and culminating in a mega disaster due to a 
nuclear meltdown.233 The Great East Japan Earthquake was more than just an 
earthquake; it was an “earthquake, a tsunami, a nuclear power plant accident, a power 
supply failure, and a large-scale disruption of supply chains.”234 
The initial earthquake caused the seafloor to shift upward by 30 feet in a section 
that is larger than the state of Connecticut.235 This shift was the catalyst for the tsunami 
that decimated much of the Tohoku coastline. The tsunami’s impact included the deaths 
of 20,000 people, the destruction of 130,000 houses, and the shutdown of public 
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transportation and roadways.236 Fukushima, Iwate, and Miyagi suffered the most 
damage. 
In Japan’s recorded history, the population had not seen an event of this 
magnitude with such a high impact and low probability of occurrence.237 Nevertheless, 
according to an after-action report, Japan’s advanced disaster management response 
“proved its worth … the loss of life and property could have been far greater if the 
country’s policies and practices had been less effective.”238 Prior to the 2011 earthquake, 
Japan had invested heavily in disaster management mitigation features to improve 
policies, infrastructure, building regulations, and decision-making processes, which 
lessened the impact of the earthquake.239 
The Japanese government takes a comprehensive approach to disaster risk 
management, and a key element is its emphasis on training and education for both 
citizens and officials of various agencies. Local governments are staffed with well-trained 
and well-educated disaster responders.240 For example, Japan’s “central government 
encourages local governments to promote structural measures by providing financial 
support, producing technical guidelines and manuals, and conducting training for 
technical staff in planning, design, operation, and maintenance.”241 
One specific pre-hazard measure used to foster education and training drills was 
the dissemination of hazard maps. For reference, hazard maps detail information on 
evacuation routes, shelter locations, and high-risk areas.242 The hazard maps that were 
distributed during the 2011 event included important information that saved lives. 
However, Japanese officials learned that only 20 percent of households in the area most 
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impacted had received the maps, which shows that the number of recipients needs to 
increase substantially.  
Before the 2011 earthquake, Japan had created a robust infrastructure to guard 
against natural hazards. Some of the mitigation measures taken included an extensive 
levee system, strict building codes, and seismically sensitive public trains.243 While the 
levees did not withstand the 2011 tsunami, the structures allowed some citizens a few 
more minutes to evacuate to higher ground.244 A breakwater built at Kamaishi Bay, 
which was ultimately destroyed, was able to weaken the tsunami by approximately 40 
percent.245 An important takeaway for officials was the potential size a tsunami could 
reach, as levees and breakwaters that may have been sufficient for average tsunamis were 
insufficient for the 2011 tsunami. 
The 2011 event resulted in a number of issues for “fixed-line” and mobile-phone 
infrastructure. For example, the exchange facility was inundated by water from the 
tsunami, which caused “damage to underground cables and conduits, destruction of 
telephone poles and overhead cables, destruction and loss of mobile-phone base stations, 
and draining of backup batteries during the long power outages.”246 To facilitate 
communications for people to either confirm the safety of themselves or their loved ones, 
telecommunications carriers organized an emergency messaging network.247 
Japan’s tsunami warning system is the most sophisticated in the world, but the 
system was still unprepared for the magnitude of the tsunami. It is comprised of satellite 
communications and “hundreds of real-time monitoring stations” and despite that 
technology, underestimated the size of the approaching tsunami.248 The Japan 
Meteorological Agency (JMA) monitors seismic activity, and in 2011, a warning was 
disseminated to disaster management officials in the first few minutes after the 
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earthquake.249 Initial estimates placed the tsunami’s height at three to six meters, which 
was well below the actual figure. Revisions to the estimate were made, but ultimately, 
approximately 70 percent of the population did not receive the updated information.  
The early warning systems are often what most encourage people to evacuate to 
safer zones. Research shows that approximately 60 percent of people who heard the early 
earthquake warnings took action, such as evacuating or seeking shelter.250 To further 
complicate matters, many of the radio networks suffered equipment damage that put 
broadcasts out of commission and prohibited disaster management officials from using 
the radio as a means of communicating important information to tsunami victims. 
Overall, Japan’s strategy for applying the lessons learned from previous 
earthquakes and tsunamis ensured that the country was more prepared than most for a 
large-scale disaster such as the 2011 earthquake and subsequent tsunami. Employing a 
similar advanced preparation strategy could also be beneficial in forming a NEO 
mitigation strategy, specifically in the areas of education and training, infrastructure, and 
communications. Japan could offer insight into how the public can be involved in the pre-
event planning stages by receiving education on the hazards and by practicing training 
drills. In addition, buildings that had been reinforced to meet the strict safety codes were 
able to withstand the earthquake. Japanese officials also learned the importance of 
communicating accurate warnings to the public and aid groups as they may be the only 
updates received during the disaster. Similarly, a NEO impact could happen quickly, 
disrupting communications, and there may be limited time to issue warnings.  
1. Domestic Response 
Japanese leaders continuously work to fortify and modify their disaster risk 
management system. Japan emphasizes the importance of community participation for a 
successful mitigation strategy, a factor that contributed to countless lives saved during the 
2011 event.251 Citizens are aware of the dangers of natural disasters that have historically 
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hit Japan, and “community based disaster risk management activities are well integrated 
into the daily lives of most Japanese.”252 Parents communicate the hazards of tsunamis to 
children through stories.253 Training drills are also emphasized and, in 2010, Japan 
conducted a national earthquake drill in which 670,000 people participated.254 Local 
neighborhood groups, known as Jichikai, are involved in decision-making meetings and 
assigned roles in the event of a disaster.255  
Volunteers from these community groups were some of the first responders.256 
Locals had also participated in evacuation drills prior to the event, which ultimately saved 
many lives.257 Researchers found that “most people saved from major disasters are 
rescued by relatives within the first 24 hours—before professional responders can get 
there,” demonstrating the importance of encouraging and promoting community 
involvement through pre-disaster training drills. This organized participation was an asset 
to Japan and reinforced the need for communities to “explore and identify [their] best 
defense, mixing various soft and hard measures, policies, investments, education 
initiatives, and drills through sound analysis and stakeholder consultations.”258 
Buildings that met Japan’s most current building codes were able to withstand the 
event with only some damage.259 Japan is frequently subjected to earthquakes, which 
prompted the government and academics to conduct research on building damage and to 
update building code regulations.260 The infrastructure reinforcement meant that most of 
the buildings survived the initial earthquake, but could not withstand the ensuing 
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tsunami.261 Japan’s building codes are stringent and consistently evolve, as more is 
understood about natural hazards and the damage they can cause. 
The roads and highways were also used as disaster management facilities or 
temporary shelters due to the fact that they had been designed to withstand impacts from 
an earthquake or tsunami.262 In addition, Japan had equipped its bullet trains with 
earthquake sensors that would stop the train as soon as earthquake activity occurred.263 
This function allowed all trains to safely stop after the 2011 earthquake, preventing 
further loss of life.264 
The catastrophic damage to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station by the 
tsunami became one of the largest lessons learned for Japan. Although the power station 
had protective measures installed in the event of a natural hazard, the sheer enormity of 
the 2011 event led to massive failure of those safety measures. An after-action report 
found that one of the points of failure was that “complex scenarios with multiple hazards 
consisting of earthquakes and tsunamis, compounded by simultaneous transport and 
communications failures, had not been foreseen.”265 This finding could be applied to a 
NEO strategy, as a NEO impact would also involve multiple hazards and mitigation 
strategies. 
Communications systems are integral during all stages of an event to perform 
such tasks as disseminating warnings, keeping emergency personnel informed, and 
confirming the safety of loved ones. Ensuring good communications for the accurate 
dissemination of information “enables individuals and communities not only to stay safe, 
but also to contribute more effectively to relief and recovery.”266 Officials learned that 
earthquake warning technology would need to be continually refined, but also, “no matter 
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how advanced technology becomes," citizens should evacuate for higher ground when an 
earthquake hits."267  
Additionally, the use of social media in disaster management has been expanding, 
and social media played a critical role in the 2011 event. Researchers found that Twitter, 
in particular, was the most used social media platform for people to relay information 
during the disaster.268 Twitter published a blog that detailed how best to use the service 
in a disaster and identified specific hashtags relevant to the event, using both English and 
Japanese to communicate with a larger audience. The company also created a site that 
was accessible via mobile phone without the Twitter application.269 Publishing this site 
allowed access to 115 million phone users in Japan.270 The Japanese population at the 
time of the disaster was approximately 126 million, which means that 91 percent of the 
population would have been able to access the Twitter site.271  
Facebook is one of the most popular social media platforms in the world and was 
also used during the 2011 disaster in several different ways.272 The network allowed 
people to contact loved ones and receive updates on the conditions in Japan. Aid 
organizations and volunteers created Facebook groups “to help with the relief efforts in 
terms of direct support and informational support … [and] it provided the means of 
communication for the groups to function.”273 After-action reports and the media labeled 
Facebook “a lifeline in the disaster.”274 Another way Facebook assisted communication 
efforts was to create a main page, called ‘Disaster Relief’ with relevant disaster 
information.275 This page also placed relevant information on blackouts and 
                                                 
267 Ranghieri and Ishiwatari, Learning from Megadisasters, 96. 
268 Brett D. M. Peary, Rajib Shaw, and Yukiko Takeuchi, “Utilization of Social Media in the East 
Japan Earthquake and Tsunami and its Effectiveness,” Journal of Natural Disaster Science 34, no. 1 







275 Ibid., 8. 
 52
transportation schedules onto users’ Newsfeeds, meaning that users would see the 
messages first when logging in.276 Also, while many of the inundated phone lines were 
out of service, mobile phone users could access the website due to cellular broadband 
capabilities.277 
2. International Response 
After the earthquake, the United States stepped in to offer immediate assistance to 
the Japanese people. One of the main priorities was ensuring that funding was made 
available to assist in the rescue of citizens. The United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) took over coordination of response donations and issued $100k 
immediately after the U.S. Ambassador declared the Japanese earthquake an 
emergency.278 In addition, on March 12, 2011, the Secretary of Defense directed $35 
million in Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) to Japan.279 
The United States also sent an experienced disaster management team from 
Washington, DC, to Japan. This group of experts, including those from the Department of 
Energy and the Department of Health and Human Services, was created to research and 
mitigate the after-effects of the earthquake, namely the nuclear radiation spill. Subject 
matter experts also worked closely with the Japanese government in monitoring the “path 
of any radioactive release.”280  
Before Operation Tomodachi, a disaster relief operation comprised of U.S. 
military, U.S. military branches that were already stationed in, or near, Japan facilitated 
operations such as search and rescue, translation assistance, and medical support.281 This 
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large military presence was integral for allowing immediate support to the Japanese after 
the earthquake. U.S. government officials worked with their Japanese counterparts during 
the event and offered extensive military resources.282 Operation Tomodachi employed 16 
naval ships to assist with the disaster relief and response efforts after the earthquake.283 
This immediate coordination and knowledge sharing improved the response in Japan and 
protected the international community by tracking the spread of the nuclear spill. 
C. CONCLUSION 
California and Japan are both earthquake-prone areas with disaster management 
officials who focus on educating the public on the disaster before it happens, which 
increases the likelihood of an effective response. This process of continuously updating 
the public could be valuable for creating a disaster management strategy for other largely 
unpredictable events, such as a NEO. Additionally, incorporating pre-event training 
exercises for officials and citizens can limit the loss of life during an actual crisis. Loma 
Prieta and the Great East Japan Earthquake caused losses to lifeline infrastructure 
systems ranging from transportation to the power grid, but a great deal was learned 
because of those impacts. Furthermore, Japan’s robust infrastructure offers examples of 
how to shore up roads, transportation, and critical services. Both the Loma Prieta 
Earthquake and the Great East Japan Earthquake highlighted the need for communication 
between disaster groups and for dissemination of accurate information to the public. 
These events, much like a NEO, are unavoidable and unpredictable, but with proper 
planning the consequences do not have to be catastrophic.  
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The previous case study chapters have highlighted areas of disaster management 
and response that have been the most effective. These measures are not a guarantee 
against loss of life or damage to infrastructure, but they have greatly lessened the degree 
of impact from natural disasters. This chapter will state the lessons that can best be 
applied to a NEO impact event and provide recommendations on a way forward. 
Education and training should focus on both first responders and the general 
public. First responders need to receive education on NEOs to plan exercises and 
scenarios that would provide the most suitable preparedness training for an impact. The 
public also needs to be educated on the NEO threat and how they should respond in the 
event of an impact event. The Japanese disseminated hazard maps to identify important 
information and a similar tactic could be used for public education of NEOs. Patrick 
Lynett, assistant professor of civil engineering at Texas A&M, researched the after-
effects of tsunamis and “noted that the disaster reinforces the importance of education in 
preparing the public to respond to such events.”284 As discussed in Chapter IV, when the 
Japanese earthquake occurred there was insufficient warning and little time for locals to 
escape the tsunami. The public had to respond based on knowledge from previous 
training. Similarly, a NEO impact could strike with little or no advance warning, 
requiring the public to be educated on matters such as shelter locations or evacuation 
routes. 
The eruptions of Mount St. Helens and Eyjafjallajökull resulted in increased 
research into the threat of volcanic eruptions and prompted the modification of disaster 
protocols. These new protocols are particularly relevant to a NEO impact because of what 
was learned about the effects of ash and volcanic debris on important areas of 
infrastructure. Researchers collected data on the movement of ash clouds and, in the case 
of Eyjafjallajökull, saw firsthand that ash could shut down the airline industry. The 
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experience gained on the effects of ash on airplane engines gave emergency personnel a 
better idea of what the machines can withstand before airborne ash reaches unsafe levels. 
This information is critical as responders likely will need to rely on aircraft to conduct 
rescue and transport operations for those affected by a NEO event. Additionally, the 
establishment of new policy on safe levels of ash for aviation can be used in a NEO 
crisis. 
As learned from the Loma Prieta and Great East Japan earthquakes, reinforced 
disaster-resistant structures are often a critical component to mitigation practices for other 
HILP events. Russell Schweickart, co-founder of the Association of Space Explorers and 
the B612 Foundation, asserts that evacuation is an “important element of mitigation, for it 
is by far the most likely case we are facing. But it requires further development of 
infrastructure.”285 Research suggests that a NEO impact with little to no advance warning 
is a likely scenario and, in these cases, government officials would need to ensure that 
potential shelters, such as schools or churches, meet required safety standards.  
An organized communications strategy is another component of HILP event 
responses. Richard Eisner, coastal regional administrator for the California Office of 
Emergency Services (OES), “stressed the importance of reliable warning systems and the 
need to provide accurate information to the general public.”286 Conveying accurate 
information to other agencies and the public could limit the loss of life. These agencies 
need to relay this information to disaster response teams as they are attempting rescues, 
and members of the public need to be kept informed as they seek safety. The case studies 
examined in this thesis offer both traditional and newer methods to promote 
communications among citizens and disaster management officials. Ultimately, the costs 
of implementing education and exercise planning, infrastructure development, and 
communications may be significantly less than those of the large-scale mitigation 
projects that involve action from space.  
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A. DOMESTIC RECOMMENDATIONS 
The importance of before-hand disaster training and preparedness as highlighted 
in previous chapters would be integral to a NEO impact strategy. The first step is to 
educate people on the NEO threat. The only exposure many have had to the idea of a 
NEO impact is through film or television. Accurate information, based on scientific 
research, needs to be made available to the general public well in advance. An effective 
start could be adding NEO awareness education to school curricula so that people learn 
about the threat from an early age. In addition, the potential after-effects of a NEO 
impact, such as shattered windows from a shockwave or a debris cloud, should be 
outlined so the public knows what to expect. The intent is not to cause fear or panic, but 
to limit the amount that is unknown to the public and responders.  
Participating in training exercises has been shown to limit the loss of life and 
improve disaster response strategies. The U.S. government should partner with NASA on 
creating a protocol for a NEO event similar to the drop, cover, and hold on protocol that 
is practiced during earthquakes. In the 1950s and 1960s, “duck and cover” and sheltering 
drills were practiced regularly in schools.287 In this case, it may be a combination of 
taking cover and also seeking shelter elsewhere. In the event of an impact, there would 
likely be mass confusion, and preventative measures such as pre-training drills could lead 
to a more organized response. 
Strong infrastructure offers protection in a disaster and ensures critical operations 
can continue, making it an important component of disaster management. One of the big 
concerns of a NEO event is having buildings that can withstand the effects of an impact 
or shockwave. Reinforcements can include small measures such as shatter-safe glass. 
Larger measures might be constructing a structure that could be used as a NEO-resistant 
shelter. For the latter, which involves engineering capabilities and new technology, it 
could be useful to propose an infrastructure challenge similar to the Google Lunar X-
Prize challenge. 
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In 2007, Google launched a competition for teams to create a rover that could 
land on the moon, “travel 500 meters, and transmit back high definition video and 
images.”288 These teams are privately funded and upon completion of a successful 
project receive award money from a $30 million prize fund. This initiative crowdsourced 
ideas from outside the government and incentivized the process. To date, a handful of 
teams have reached milestones toward the final goal, but the process is still ongoing. A 
similar competition could be used to create NEO-resistant structures or habitats. 
Additionally, funding for these kinds of projects could be gained by partnering with 
forward-thinking billionaires. This crowdsourcing of funding occurred recently when 
Yuri Milner—a Russian billionaire, physicist, and venture capitalist—launched the $100 
million project “Breakthrough Listen” with the purpose of finding extraterrestrial life.289 
Milner partnered with two other well-known entrepreneurs: Sergey Brin, Google co-
founder, and Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook founder. This method of obtaining funding for 
these infrastructure projects sidesteps government issues such as bureaucratic delays and 
lack of funding, but would require a considerable financial contribution without an 
immediate return on investment.  
Media platforms offer both officials and the public the accurate and timely 
communications they need during a HILP event. Communications for both officials and 
the public have to be accurate, timely, and available on various media platforms. The 
integration and increased use of social media in disaster management has been discussed 
in the previous chapters and should be applied to the NEO issue. For example, 
establishing a social media presence before the event is helpful in establishing trust and 
familiarity for people. It is also another method that information on the threat can be 
presented at all stages: pre-event, during, and after. Facebook and Twitter could be 
integral aids in a NEO mitigation strategy. In addition to supplying real-time information 
on an event, they both could offer a platform to convey information on shelters, 
evacuation, and status updates. In 2014, Facebook introduced a new feature called 
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“Safety Check” that allows people in disaster areas to digitally check in, so family and 
friends know they are safe. It was informally used before the official launch during the 
2011 Japan earthquake and was more recently employed for the first time in the United 
States after a gunman opened fire at a Florida nightclub.290 A similar alert, safety check, 
and informational page could be used in a NEO impact event. 
Another communications strategy that could be used to educate the public 
involves a NEO-centric television program hosted by a well-respected researcher and 
public figure, such as Neil deGrasse Tyson. In 2014, “Cosmos: A Space Odyssey” 
premiered on the National Geographic and Fox channels and was an international 
success. The short series was viewed by 135 million viewers worldwide, of whom 45 
million were in the United States.291 This number demonstrates both the international 
interest in space and the expansive impact television can have as a communications tool. 
The program could also be web-streamed to increase viewership. Using this platform to 
inform the public about NEOs allows for greater outreach and could generate greater 
interest in the topic. 
B. INTERNATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
Ensuring the international community is involved in the NEO mitigation process 
is in the best interests of the United States for a number of reasons. Expanding the 
involvement of scientists and researchers across the globe could increase the likelihood of 
successful NEO strategies. Additionally, making the NEO issue a more prominent global 
focus would increase resources and funding substantially. Also, the involvement of 
prominent leaders would help establish legitimacy, resulting in greater public awareness. 
Since a NEO is a threat to humankind and politically neutral, the list of allies would 
likely expand. In the event of a NEO impact, increased collaboration and reliance on 
allies could be critical for saving lives.  
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It could be beneficial for the United States to host a summit and take the lead in 
creating a plan for NEOs. This summit should include international leaders. It is also 
important to invite representatives from the scientific community who have researched 
NEOs and can inform attendees on the realities of a NEO impact. Lastly, by including 
private sector figureheads such as the CEOs of Twitter, Facebook, and SpaceX, a new 
and more holistic approach to NEOs can be taken. Details on aid, technology sharing, and 
other assistance can be decided before a NEO event takes place. In addition, this forum 
could serve as an educational opportunity for other countries without NEO programs. 
Earth-based and space-based mitigation scenarios could be constructed based on a 
number of inputs from the community, further strengthening the plan and fostering 
collaboration between countries.  
The European community, much like the United States, also has the opportunity 
to examine and assess infrastructure resilience for a NEO impact. Other countries could 
follow the competition initiative to crowd-source ideas for stronger, NEO resistant 
infrastructure as an Earth-based response, or engineer a deflection device for a space-
based mitigation response. Additionally, the international community could partner with 
the United States to create a challenge that is truly an international initiative to engineer 
more resilient and robust infrastructure. This would increase the knowledge base, 
incorporate more players, and ultimately produce more ideas. During the NEO summit, 
the United States could propose a collaborative infrastructure project similar to the 
challenge proposed in the domestic recommendations section, but on the international 
level. Similarly, the international competition could request inputs for the creation of a 
space-based deflection system. The increase in scope and international participation 
would allow for increased funding and cost sharing.  
Increasing communications and collaboration between countries could also serve 
to strengthen a NEO response strategy. These communication efforts should be led by 
prominent figureheads and leaders in each country. Such leaders would have more 
influence on their people, and their participation would demonstrate an investment in 
tackling the NEO issue. Ideally, these figureheads would attend the proposed NEO 
summit and work with their counterparts to create uniform NEO response policies and 
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protocols. This information would then be translated into different languages and 
disseminated to citizens through social media sites, during leadership speeches, and on 
radio and television programs.  
Lastly, as no NEO early warning system currently exists, it is critical that a timely 
early-warning network is established. As demonstrated in the 2011 Japan earthquake, the 
tsunami warning system offered valuable minutes for citizens to seek shelter. NEOs can 
also be unpredictable and strike with little warning, as was the case in Chelyabinsk, so it 
is imperative that a warning network is created to disseminate warnings to citizens and 
officials. This system could employ both space- and ground-based sensors to aid in the 
monitoring capabilities.292    
C. LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
It must be noted that this thesis and its findings take an in-depth look at only one 
facet of the NEO impact issue, resulting in some limitations. For example, the potential 
mass of a NEO could negate a number of recommendations in this study. If the NEO 
were on scale with the K-T meteor, most Earth-based mitigation options proposed would 
not be useful. In addition, proposed space-based mitigation efforts might have priority, 
and the focus may be on detecting objects far in advance. At the time this thesis was 
written, NASA has agreed to move forward with the next stage of the Asteroid Redirect 
Mission (ARM), a space-based NEO deflection initiative with an estimated $1.4 billion 
cost.293  
These recommendations are only first steps. In the future, researchers could 
advance the work on NEO impact mitigation in a few different ways. For example, after 
the international summit, it would be important to test the proposed ideas and set 
milestones for each stage of implementation. A comparative analysis could be conducted 
to assess if one competition had stronger results and pinpoint why. The strongest points 
of each could be highlighted and incorporated into a revised competition.  
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The after-effects of the media communications strategy could also be evaluated to 
ascertain if the efforts were successful. One way to do this would be to use Google 
Analytics, which analyzes website traffic, locations, and queries.294 The location 
information could be particularly revealing as it would provide insight into where the 
communications strategy is working. Researchers could also partner directly with Google 
and receive data on whether web searches related to NEOs were increasing, decreasing, 
or unchanged. Similarly, Twitter could be used as a resource to pull data on the frequency 
and trends of NEO-related hashtags. Many bemoan the increasing use of social media, 
but it can be one of the strongest tools for assessing public interest and awareness of a 
topic. Much could be done to address the possibility of NEO impacts, and rather than 
continuing to dismiss the idea of black swans, we must accept their existence and work to 
address the potential problems they pose. 
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